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When parties enter into an agreement1 to engage in illegal transactions,2 and
bring their dispute to a U.S. court,3 they put the court in the proverbial position
between a rock and a hard place. Enforcing the agreement is universally

1. Courts and authors have often referred to these types of agreements as “illegal contracts,”
but as Professor Corbin pointed out, an illegal contract is a “self-contradictory” term. ARTHUR
LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1373, at 1 (1962). The word “contract” suggests legal
enforceability. Therefore, if an agreement is illegal, it will not amount to a “contract” in the legal
sense. This article follows Professor Corbin’s preference and uses the words “agreement,”
“promise,” or “bargain” to avoid conceptual confusion. See id.
2. This article’s reference to illegal transactions includes both transactions that violate an
explicit statute or regulation and those that are declared illegal and unenforceable due to violation
of a more general notion of public policy as ascertained by the courts. See id. § 1374, at 5‒6. Some
authors use the phrase “contracts against public policy” to describe all agreements that are declared
unenforceable. See, e.g., David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public
Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 563‒64 (2012). Professor Williston uses the terms “illegal
bargain” or “illegal agreement.” 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 12:1, at 695 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2009). To avoid confusion with the broader public
policy doctrine applied in non-contractual context, this article uses the phrase “illegal agreements”
or “illegal transactions” to cover all agreements that are illegal because they violate either explicit
legislation or a particular public policy not explicitly articulated by the legislature.
3. This article focuses on the issue of illegality related to transactions between private
individuals. It does not address any issues related to the broader public policy doctrine in noncontractual contexts. For an article discussing policy regarding tax or federal spending issues, see
Johnny Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 397, 397‒99
(2005).
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considered a bad idea.4 It is antithetical to the courts’ role to uphold the law,5
and it undermines the legitimacy and dignity of the law.6 Thus, the nonenforcement rule is deemed necessary to deter illegal agreements.7
Non-enforcement, however, presents its own unique problems. Refusal to
enforce a bargain struck by two private parties offends the fundamental
principles of freedom of contract and party autonomy.8 It also undermines
contract law’s goal of maintaining certainty of contracts.9 Worse yet, nonenforcement may run afoul of sound public policy by inadvertently creating
incentives to enter into additional illegal agreements and engage in more illegal
activities when non-enforcement allows a party to retain a windfall, undermining
the very purpose for the non-enforcement rule.10
Such illegal agreement disputes place U.S. courts in the crossfire of multiple
conflicting interests that go to the essence of the kind of a society we have or

4. See Bank of United States v. Owens, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 527, 538‒39 (1829) (stating that “no
court of justice can in its nature be made the handmaid of iniquity. Courts are instituted to carry
into effect the laws of a country, how can they then become auxiliary to the consummation of
violations of law?”).
5. See Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 412 (1889); Harry G. Prince, Public
Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements: Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REV.
163, 165‒66 (1985).
6. See Robert A. Prentice, Of Tort Reform and Millionaire Muggers: Should an Obscure
Equitable Doctrine Be Revived to Dent the Litigation Crisis?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 53, 106
(1995).
7. McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669‒70 (1899) (commenting that “[t]o refuse to
grant either party to an illegal contract judicial aid for the enforcement of his alleged rights under
it tends strongly towards reducing the number of such transactions to a minimum”).
8. See Note: Validity of Contracts Which Violate Regulatory Statutes, 50 YALE L. J. 1108,
1108 (1941) [hereinafter Yale Note] (acknowledging that the non-enforcement rule “conflict[s]
with the more basic policy of preserving the inviolability of contracts”); see also Eldridge v.
Johnston, 245 P.2d 239, 251 (1952) (noting that “public policy requires that men of full age and
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when
entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice,
and it is only when some other over-powering rule of public policy . . . intervenes, rendering such
agreement illegal, that it will not be enforced”).
9. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern
Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 116‒17 (1988); Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal:
New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1496 (2010) (noting that “the breadth
of the public policy doctrine impairs the certainty and predictability of contractual enforcement in
California relative to that which obtains in New York”); see Prince, supra note 5, at 166.
10. Armstrong v. Toler, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 258, 260 (1826) (suggesting that an expansion
of the non-enforcement rule “would lead to the most inconvenient consequences; carried out to
such an extent, it would deserve to be entitled a rule to encourage and protect fraud”); M.P.
Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L. J. 267, 284 (1966) (noting that “[i]t
is notorious that the effect of declaring a contract illegal is often to confer an undeserved reward on
one party”); John W. Wade, Benefits Obtained Under Illegal Transactions, 25 TEX. L. REV. 31, 55
(1946) (pointing out that “[t]o a defrauder, the knowledge that the law will permit him to keep illgotten gains will be an incentive to induce another to participate in an illegal contract”).
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would like to have.11 These disputes implicate issues related to the proper scope
of government regulation of private market behavior and the limits of private
individuals to manage their own affairs.12 It forces a court to confront its own
role in a system based on separation of powers.13 Understandably, courts
struggle to balance these multiple competing interests.14
The resulting body of case law, sometimes referred as the doctrine of illegality
or void for public policy doctrine, has been described as “a mess,”15 a “rather

11. See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 431,
446 (1993). In deciding whether a plaintiff could recover money paid under an illegal agreement,
one court described the dilemma faced by courts, noting:
The courts have struggled with conflicting considerations of policy for hundreds of years
in situations akin to the one here now. On the one hand, the courts are bent upon
discouraging fraud and deceit by permitting such a recovery against defendants as this to
the plaintiff here; on the other hand, if in the process of being defrauded, the plaintiff was
knowingly participating in an illegal scheme, the courts have sometimes denied recovery
to the plaintiff in order to discourage the illegality involved even though the fraud of
defendants would remain unremedied.
Fellner v. Marino, 158 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26‒27 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956).
12. F. H. Buckley, Perfectionism, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 133, 139 (2005) (noting that the
doctrine of illegality sits at the border between public and private ordering); Shell, supra note 11,
at 437‒38. This Article does not intend to join the debate about whether contracts are public or
private.
13. See, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting all legislative powers in Congress); U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1 (vesting the judicial power in one supreme court).
14. This balancing approach is reflected in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
178 (1981) which states as follows:
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy
if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such
terms.
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account is taken of
(a) the parties’ justified expectations,
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term.
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account is taken of
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial decisions,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy,
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it was
deliberate, and
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term.
15. Peter Birks, Recovering Value Transferred Under an Illegal Contract, 1 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 155, 156 (2000). According to Professor Birks, this confusing state of affairs does
not seem to be unique to the U.S. courts. Id. at 156‒57. He described the English approach as
“riddled with contradictions and evasions.” Id. at 158.
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confusing,”16 or “vast . . . mysterious area of the law.”17 Legal scholars, noting
the courts’ handling of illegal agreements lacks a comprehensive philosophy or
analytical framework,18 have been searching for a coherent theory to explain or
streamline the courts’ treatment of such agreements.19 One author proposes to
explain the doctrine of illegality with a unified “efficient deterrence theory.”20
Another advocates an approach that would predicate remedial judgments on a
showing of harm instead of non-enforcement as the presumptive remedy.21 A
third author suggests that, even if an agreement is unenforceable due to illegality,
recovery should be permitted if failure to do so would “stultify” the law.22
This Article builds on the existing scholarship and joins the search for
“consistency and rationality.”23 This Article offers the insight that, contrary to
common belief, courts’ approach to illegal agreements shows a consistent
pattern. A review of randomly selected cases24 shows that the courts have, by
and large, consistently (albeit implicitly) applied the lesser evil principle25 in
adjudicating the disputes.26 Based on this insight, this Article advocates for a

16. Note, A Law and Economics Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1445, 1445 (2006) [hereinafter Harvard Note 2006].
17. George A. Strong, The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 347‒
48 (1961) (noting that unenforceable contracts may become so in a “changing socio-economic
environment”).
18. Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 120‒21; Harvard Note 2006, supra note 16, at 1445.
19. Adam B. Badawi, Harm, Ambiguity, and the Regulation of Illegal Contracts, 17 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 483, 487 (2010); Birks, supra note 15, at 156; Friedman, supra note 2, at 564‒66;
Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 120‒21 (offering a unified efficient deterrence theory with regard to
the judicial relief provided upon finding of illegality); Harvard Note 2006, supra note 16, at 1465‒
66 (offering a law and economics approach with regard to the non-enforcement remedies).
20. Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 121‒22.
21. Badawi, supra note 19, at 487.
22. Birks, supra note 15, at 160, 191.
23. Id. at 203.
24. Due to the enormous volume of cases addressing this issue, this article relies only on
selected random review of cases. For example, the search term: contract or agreement /5 illegal or
“public policy” yielded 486 cases total in the Westlaw U.S. Supreme Court cases database alone
on September 10, 2014. The same search for cases after January 1, 2000 in the All State and Federal
database on Westlaw yielded over 10,000 results. The case review focused on only those cases
involving contract disputes between private parties and where illegality was raised as a defense.
25. The word “evil” as used in this article does not refer to an event or consequence that is
deemed morally wrong, as used in a typical moralist debate. For examples of such, see Gabriella
Blum, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil”, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2‒3 (2010). In this article,
“evil” is used in a broader, generic sense to refer to any harm, injury, or compromise of an
important principle, as used by courts or some other scholars. See, e.g., Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v.
Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 68 (1873) (using the word “evils” to describe the injuries to the
public resulting from contracts in restraint of trade); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989).
26. No court appears to have explicitly acknowledged the lesser evil principle in resolving
the illegality dispute based on a randomly selected case review and a targeted search in the All State
and Federal database on Westlaw, using the search terms “contract or agreement /s illegal! and
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more explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle when courts are called upon
to resolve disputes involving illegal agreements. This Article, the first to
advocate for an explicit recognition of the lesser evil principle in private law,
draws upon the courts’ explicit adoption of the principle in criminal and tort law
and its implicit adoption of the principle when resolving illegal agreement
disputes.
The principle forwarded in this Article is not impermeable from disputation.
The principle itself does not provide a desired substantive standard.27 It does
not readily provide the clarity and certainty desired because it does not answer
certain fundamental questions; namely, what the evils are, and, more
importantly, which of the evils society deems as the lesser.28 This deficiency,
however, is more attributable to the nature of the interests implicated.29 Despite
its limitations, the lesser evil principle provides a better understanding of courts’

“lesser evil” on September 10, 2014.” Some U.S. Supreme Court cases have described the
consequences in terms of evils. See, e.g., Oregon Steam Nav. Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 68. Some
lower courts have also expressed the same sentiment. Appeal of Bredin, 92 Pa. 241, 247 (Pa. 1879)
(allowing an illegality defense where the plaintiff obtained a judgment on a note given by the
defendant, so that the defendant would not be prosecuted for forgery, “to prevent the evil which
would be produced by enforcing the contract or allowing it to stand”); Gaspard v. Offshore Crane
& Equip., Inc., No. CIV.A. 94-261, 1998 WL 388597, at *5 (E.D. La. July 8, 1998) (using the word
“evil” to describe actions that are deemed to be against the public policy of a state).
27. Re’em Segev, Moral Justification, Administrative Power and Emergencies, 53 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 629, 631 (2005); see Martha Minow, What Is the Greatest Evil?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2134,
2139 (2005) (noting the “central difficulty” with identifying evil is that “[e]vil is obvious only in
retrospect”) (quoting GLORIA STEINEM, If Hitler Were Alive, Whose Side Would He Be On?, in
OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS 332, 346 (2d ed. 1995)). The lesser evil
principle is similar to the proportionality principle, which the Court has adopted in its constitutional
review of government actions. See Peter P. Swire, Proportionality for High-Tech Searches, 6 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 751, 751 (2009). However, that principle itself does not provide a criterion. Pamela
S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal
Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 882‒83 (2004) (pointing out that “proportionality is both an
inherently alluring and an inevitably unsatisfactory measure of constitutionality. . . . [T]he problem
lies in translating the principle into a standard for judicial oversight. For all the Court’s invocation
of objective factors, it turns out that a key aspect of proportionality review remains fundamentally
subjective”); John T. Noonan, Jr., Religious Liberty at the Stake, 84 VA. L. REV. 459, 470‒71
(1998) (criticizing the proportionality test as “extraordinary” and unsupported by precedent).
28. In our system of government, as adjudicators of contract disputes, the judicial branch has
the duty to interpret and apply the law. The Judicial Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/our-government/judicial-branch (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). The lesser evil
principle, however, does not tell us who is in the best position to answer these questions. The
author assumes that the courts are the ones that are entrusted with answering these questions.
However, this Article does not address the issue of the proper role of courts in determining what
public policy is or whether the courts have usurped the legislature’s role in declaring what public
policy is.
29. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR
8‒9 (Princeton Univ. Press 2004) (noting where a lesser evil position applies, the analysis will be
complicated as “there are no trump cards, no table-clearing justifications or claims” that simplify
the inquiry).
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adjudication of illegal agreement disputes30 and provides a more predictive
framework for how U.S. courts approach the complex issues presented by illegal
agreements.31 An explicit adoption of the principle would allow courts to begin
the process of refining the substantive standards when resolving illegal
agreement disputes.32 This would lead to more certainty in the marketplace.
Finally, because courts have by and large been following the principle already,
the implementation of explicit adoption would not be overly burdensome.
To provide a context for the discussions, Part I of this Article introduces the
lesser evil principle and the general areas where the principle has been applied.33
Part II briefly reviews the explicit adoption by U.S. courts of the principle in the
field of criminal and tort law. Part III sets forth examples of implicit judicial
adoption of the principle in resolving illegal agreement disputes. Part IV
advances arguments in favor of an explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle.
Finally, this Article concludes with an argument for the explicit adoption of the
lesser evil principle when resolving illegal agreement disputes.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LESSER EVIL PRINCIPLE
Originating from two great ancient classical Greek philosophers, Aristotle and
Epicurus,34 the lesser evil principle35 applies to situations where an actor is
forced to choose between competing options, all of which breach a moral
principle.36 The principle describes a pragmatic (albeit controversial) way to

30. Many common law contract doctrines are vague and incomplete. See Curtis Bridgeman,
Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy: Positivism, Formalism, and the
Specification of Rules in Contract Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1469 (2008). However,
incompleteness alone does not render a doctrine ineffective, rather the doctrines can be viewed as
partial plans to be refined over time. Id.
31. This Article does not intend to participate in the greater moral debate concerning the pros
and cons of the lesser evil principle. The lesser evil doctrine is undoubtedly highly contingent, and
determining which of the evils implicated is the lesser one will inevitably reflect the cultural, moral,
and legal values of each individual society. See Blum, supra note 25, at 55; see e.g., IGNATIEFF,
supra note 29, at 19 (discussing the lesser evil principle in the context of the fight against terrorism
following September 11, and acknowledging the need to resort to certain measures under the lesser
evil principle under certain conditions). Nor does this Article intend to join the debate about the
pros and cons of the public policy doctrine. See, e.g., Prince, supra note 5, at 166.
32. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN
AMERICAN LAW 169 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
33. With respect to assessing which is the greater evil, this Article does not intend to engage
in the debate concerning the proper role of the judiciary in determining what public policy is.
34. Sean Molloy, Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser Evil,
5 J. INT’L POL. THEORY 94, 99‒100 (2009) (explaining that Aristotle discussed the lesser evil
principle approvingly and considered it “good”).
35. The principle is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of the lesser evil or the doctrine of
the necessary evil.
36. See IGNATIEFF, supra note 29, at 8.
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solve the dilemma—by choosing the lesser of two evils.37 The principle has
often been applied to rationalize certain actions in international relations and
politics.38 In law, the principle has been mostly used to justify certain defenses
against criminal charges, for example, the concept of necessity in both common
and civil law traditions.39 Even though the principle itself is widely accepted or
tolerated, it is far more difficult to determine what the evils are and which of the
evils is the lesser.40
The lesser evil principle automatically invokes the broader philosophical
debate about what is considered “evil.”41 Where one stands on certain issues
depends on one’s political and moral values.42 For example, people who believe
in values important to a democratic system are likely to view certain putative
evils differently from those who share beliefs consistent with an authoritarian
regime.43 Further, what is deemed the more, or lesser, of the evils also changes
over time.44 Such analyses are often complicated by decision makers’ failure to
articulate the values behind their reasoning.45

37. This Article does not intend to join the broader debate about the morality of this principle.
See, e.g., IGNATIEFF, supra note 29, at 5‒6 (addressing issues related to the permissibility of the
lesser evil doctrine within the boundaries of a democracy committed to the rule of law).
38. It is beyond the scope of this Article to have a detailed discussion of the application of the
lesser evil doctrine in political and international relations. See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, On the Use
and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 447, 447‒48 (2012)
(discussing how the lesser evil doctrine has been used in politics and international relations as well
as some of the controversies surrounding the doctrine).
39. Blum, supra note 25, at 32 (noting that there are important variations in application of the
lesser evil doctrine depending on one’s values and beliefs).
40. See Segev, supra note 27, at 631 (stating that the lesser evil principle “seems obviously
justified and widely accepted”).
41. IGNATIEFF, supra note 29, at 12.
42. Blum, supra note 25, at 2. As one judge pointed out, with respect to when sufficient fraud
exists to avoid a contract, differences in outcomes depend on the kind of policy that the judge would
prefer to adopt:
If the judge writing the opinion believed that it is better to “encourage negligence in the
foolish than fraud in the deceitful,” then a more liberal view is taken as to what constitutes
fraud. On the other hand, if the judge writing the opinion believed that it is better to
“encourage fraud in the deceitful,” then the opinion is written with the view of upholding
the contract.
Birdsall v. Coon, 139 S.W. 243, 246 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911) (citation omitted).
43. See Richard L. Barnes, Delusion by Analysis: The Surrogate Mother Problem, 34 S.D. L.
REV. 1, 3‒4 (1989) (presenting examples of differing values depending on one’s political, moral,
and religious beliefs).
44. See Shell, supra note 11, at 477 (noting the more recent Supreme Court cases that have
enforced contractual waivers of certain constitutional rights); Wallihan v. Hughes, 82 S.E.2d 553,
558 (Va. 1954) (describing public policy as a “will-o’-the-wisp of the law [that] varies and changes
with the interests, habits, needs, sentiments, and fashions of the day”).
45. See Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 289 (2007).
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II. EXPLICIT APPLICATION OF THE LESSER EVIL PRINCIPLE IN U.S. CRIMINAL
AND TORT LAW
U.S. law has explicitly adopted the lesser evil principle in criminal and tort
law.46 The Model Penal Code permits a criminal defendant to assert a choice of
evil justification defense under certain conditions.47 The defense applies if the
defendant was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil to prevent
imminent harm where he reasonably anticipated a causal connection between his
actions and preventing the harm.48 In addition, the defendant must not have
other legal alternatives available to avoid inflicting the harm, and the defendant
must not cause the foreboding situation through his own negligence or
recklessness.49 For example, in criminal law the argument of self-defense under
certain conditions justifies an otherwise intentional homicide.50 So, when A is
faced with the choice of either killing B or being killed by B, A is legally
permitted to kill B—if such is unavoidable.51 Criminal law deems self-defense
(essentially the sanctioning of the intentional killing of another) as the lesser evil
in this limited situation.
U.S. tort law has also explicitly adopted the lesser evil principle in the concept
of a necessity defense.52 For example, a defendant in a civil case can respond to
a tort action claim based on trespass—the invasion of an owner’s exclusive
possessory interest in his property53—by asserting the defense of necessity.54

46. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CALIF.
L. REV. 943, 969 (1999); 1 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN, & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW
OF TORTS, § 142, at 449‒50 (2d ed. 2011).
47. For a detailed discussion of the common law defense of necessity, see Michael H.
Hoffheimer, Codifying Necessity: Legislative Resistance to Enacting Choice-Of-Evils Defenses to
Criminal Liability, 82 TUL. L. REV. 191, 197 (2007) (pointing out that “[c]ourts have always
accepted necessity as a principle limiting the reach of overbroad criminal prohibitions and
defenses”); Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification,
Not An Excuse — And Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 884 (2003).
48. Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 47, at 884.
49. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (1985) provides:
Section 3.02. Justification Generally: Choice of Evils
(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or
to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such
conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged . . . .
50. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
51. Id.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197, at 355 (1965) provides:
(1) One is privileged to enter or remain on land in the possession of another if it is or
reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent serious harm to (a) the actor, or his land or
chattels, or (b) the other or a third person, or the land or chattels of either, unless the actor
knows or has reason to know that the one for whose benefit he enters is unwilling that he
shall take such action.
53. Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 649 P.2d 922, 925 (Cal. 1982).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197, at 355 (1965).
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While allowing the defense of necessity harms an owner’s interest in exclusive
possession, courts deem it the lesser (or necessary) evil.55
By allowing the defenses of necessity and self-defense justification for
otherwise criminal or tortious conduct, U.S. laws and judges have explicitly
incorporated the lesser evil principle in the adjudication of difficult cases
involving the relationship between the state and private individuals, and between
private individuals in the public law arena.56 These principle-based defenses
allow courts to weigh competing values implicated in these cases.57
III. THE INVISIBLE PRESENCE OF THE LESSER EVIL PRINCIPLE IN ILLEGAL
AGREEMENT DISPUTES
In contrast to the explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle in criminal and
tort law, U.S. courts have generally not explicitly adopted the principle in
contract law or in resolving illegal agreement disputes.58
The prevailing view of illegal agreements is that U.S. courts generally follow
the rule of non-enforcement with multiple exceptions depending on the specifics
of each case.59 However, a close examination of many U.S. courts’ reasoning
in numerous cases shows that courts’ decisions turn more on their concern for
55. See, e.g., Rossi v. DelDuca, 181 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Mass. 1962) (“[O]ne is privileged to
enter land in the possession of another if it is, or reasonably appears to be, necessary to prevent
serious harm . . . .”).
56. See, e.g., Boaz Sangero, A New Defense for Self-Defense, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 475, 532
(2006).
57. See Hoffheimer, supra note 47, at 229 (discussing the role that judges and jurors have in
evaluating competing values).
58. See Note, Principles Governing Recovery by Parties to Illegal Contracts, 26 HARV. L.
REV. 738, 738‒39 (1913) [hereinafter Harvard Note 1913]. One could also argue that courts have
implicitly adopted the lesser evil principle in recognizing certain contract law defenses such as
fraud, incompetence, duress, undue influence, mistake, misrepresentation, unconscionability,
illegality, and void for public policy, as well as contract law excuses, such as impossibility or
frustration of purpose. The lesser evil principle offers the overarching principle for all of contract
law defenses and excuses. Courts in these situations generally chose not to enforce the contract
because non-enforcement does less harm than enforcement. See id. at 738‒39. Enforcing contracts
in these specified situations harms some important values, such as fairness, and creates adverse
incentives to engage in fraud or other unsavory practices such as duress or undue influence. See
id. at 739. Therefore, enforcement would have been the greater evil than the negative impact on
parties’ freedom to contract.
59. For a detailed discussion of the general rule related to the illegality defense and the various
exceptions, see Birks, supra note 15, at 158; Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 116‒18, 126; Strong, supra
note 17, at 347‒48, 351, 354‒55, 361‒62; Wade, supra note 10, at 31, 47; Yale Note, supra note 8,
at 1108‒09; see also Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 204 P.2d 37, 40 (Cal. 1949) (“[A] party
to an illegal contract or an illegal transaction cannot come into a court of law and ask it to carry out
the illegal contract or to enforce rights arising out of the illegal transaction.”); Arcidi v. Nat’l Assoc.
of Gov. Employees, Inc., 856 N.E.2d 167, 171 (Mass. 2006) (“[T]he general rule is that a court
leaves parties to an illegal contract in the same position as it finds them.”); Ledbetter v. Townsend,
15 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“It is well settled that the courts of Tennessee will not
enforce obligations arising out of a contract or transaction that is illegal.”).
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the consequences of their choices, rather than on the illegality of the
agreements.60 These cases show a pattern of courts choosing the option that
tolerates the less harmful consequence when considering the other available
options. That pattern is consistent with an application of the lesser evil principle
in other fields of law.61
There are a number of potential evils, or potential kinds of damage, important
to the public interest that are implicated by illegal agreement disputes. A number
of cases, depicting U.S. courts’ attempt to choose the lesser evil when
adjudicating these complicated disputes, support this notion. By examining
closely the insight sustaining these courts’ decisions, specifically the articulated
or implicit rationale supporting their rulings, one will discern the already
existing presence of the lesser evil principle in illegal agreement disputes.62
A. Potential Evils Implicated in Illegal Agreement Disputes
Courts’ analyses show that they are keenly aware of the consequences of their
choices.63 Courts explicitly, and sometimes implicitly, chose a certain option
because of their concern that the alternative would damage or undermine an
important public interest.64 There are numerous potential evils courts have
identified when resolving disputes arising out of illegal agreements.65 This
sometimes requires reading between the lines while understanding and
recognizing the dominant values of our society in the context of our governing
system.

60. See Birks, supra note 15, at 158 (“The inquiry is constantly an inquiry into consistency
and rationality, not into turpitude. Turpitude may have no role at all. Or it may be that gross
turpitude can have a role in a rare case, as a long-stop.”). As one commentator pointed out, the
“real question at issue is whether in any particular case, the ends of the law will be furthered or
defeated by granting the relief asked.” Harvard Note 1913, supra note 58, at 740.
61. See Strong, supra note 17, at 348, 354‒60, 362, 364‒65, 367‒73.
62. Part of the analytical difficulty lies in the fact that courts often fail to explicitly articulate
reasons for their decisions. For example, in one of the early cases, the Supreme Court praised the
non-enforcement rule as “a salutary one, founded in morality and good policy, and which
recommends itself to the good sense of every man as soon as it is stated.” Armstrong v. Toler, 24
U.S. (11 Wheat.) 258, 260 (1826). In another case, the Court justified its decision to enforce an
illegal agreement by announcing that the “most startling and dangerous consequences” would
follow if the Court refused to enforce the agreement. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S.
540, 547 (1902). The Court, in neither case, explicitly elaborated on concerns addressing enforcing,
or refusing to enforce, the illegal agreement. For this reason, a certain amount of reading between
the lines is necessary.
63. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 360 (1873); Bein v. Heath, 47
U.S. (6 How.) 228, 247 (1848); Gates v. Rivers Constr. Co., 515 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Alaska 1973).
64. See infra, Part III.B.2.a.iii.
65. See infra, Part III.A.1‒7. Because of the myriad ways in which illegal agreement disputes
can arise, with potential harm to numerous public policy interests, this Article does not purport to
capture all the public policy interests implicated. Rather, it highlights the public interests most
often cited by courts to support their choices when resolving illegal agreement disputes.
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1. Undermining the Legitimacy of the Law and the Good Name of the Court
A major apprehension of U.S. courts, when resolving an illegality dispute,
concerns the risk of undermining the legitimacy of the law and the dignity of the
court system.66 The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated this concern loudly and
clearly in support of the general rule of non-enforcement. For example, the
Court pointed out that a court of justice cannot be the “handmaid of iniquity”67
or “degrade itself” by using its power to aid those who have violated the law.68
Because of this concern, courts have often referred to the non-enforcement rule
as a fundamental principle.69
This concern is understandable because of the court’s role in our system of
government.70 The U.S. Constitution fashioned the judiciary as the mechanism
through which laws are enforced.71 Enforcing an agreement where the parties
attempt to engage in illegal transactions undermines the very essence of the
court’s function.72 Courts loath being put in a position where they may run the
risk of being perceived as aiding or abetting any violation of the law.73
In addition, maintaining the law is important to every functioning
government.74 In a democratic country where the rule of law prevails, public
laws express the collective will of the people through a representative

66. Bartle v. Nutt, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 184, 189 (1830); Bank of the United States v. Owens, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 527, 538‒39 (1829); Martin v. Wade, 37 Cal. 168, 176 (1869) (“The Courts, refusing
to defile their hands with those transactions, deny the parties all relief.”).
67. Owens, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 538.
68. Bartle, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 189.
69. Searles v. Haynes, 129 N.E.2d 362, 366 (Ind. App. 1955) (“It is fundamental that no
principle of law is more clearly established than that the law will not enforce an illegal
transaction.”). Despite its lack of usefulness in assisting with illegal agreement disputes, the fierce
rhetoric might have inspired the unusual loyalty to the non-enforcement principle.
70. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976) (commenting that the role of courts
is enforcing the law, and that courts have no authority to depart from this role “by a balancing of
court-devised factors”).
71. Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 439, 442 (1872) (identifying the Constitution as
the source of the judiciary’s authority; therefore, courts could never enforce a contract that would
impair the supremacy of the Constitution).
72. Bank of the United States v. Owens, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 527, 538‒39 (1829).
73. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co. of Balt., 130 U.S. 396, 412 (1889) (“We cannot assist
the plaintiff to get payment for efforts to accomplish what the law declared should not be done . . .
.”); Owens, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 538 (“The answer would seem to be plain and obvious, that no court
of justice can in its nature be made the handmaid of iniquity.”); Vaszauskas v. Vaszauskas, 161 A.
856, 858 (1932) (“It is unquestionably the general rule, upheld by the great weight of authority, that
no court will lend its assistance in any way toward carrying out the terms of a contract, the inherent
purpose of which is to violate the law.”).
74. See MAX WEBER, THE VOCATION LECTURES 34 (Rodney Livingstone trans., David
Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., 2004) (“If the state is to survive, those who are ruled over must
always acquiesce in the authority that is claimed by the rulers of the day.”).
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government.75 Laws are enacted to govern the relationship between the state
and its people.76 To allow private parties to contract irrespective of the law, and
then expect judicial intervention and remedy undermines the legitimacy of, and
the public interest promoted by, the law.77
2. Overstepping the Boundaries of the Court’s Constitutional Role
The Constitution created three separate and equal branches of government.78
With respect to the rule of law, legislators are tasked with enacting laws and are
in the best position to declare what public policy is,79 while the judiciary is
charged with interpreting and enforcing laws.80 As the U.S. Supreme Court
pointed out, the judiciary “can listen only to the mandates of law; and can tread
only that path which is marked out by duty.”81 Resolving illegal agreement
disputes can force courts to wrestle with the limits of their role in our system of
government, typically because these disputes can implicate situations where the
legislature has not spoken explicitly on the public interests worthy of being
protected.82 In those situations, courts are left to divine proper public policy,83—

75. Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74
S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2001) (“In the broadest terms, the rule of law requires that the
[democratic] state only subject the citizenry to publicly promulgated laws, that the state’s legislative
function be separate from the adjudicative function, and that no one within the polity be above the
law.”); Rule of Law: Essential Principles, DEMOCRACY WEB, http://www.democracyweb.org/
rule/principles.php (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (stating that in a democracy, “the rule of law could
be defined as the subjugation of state power to a country’s constitution and laws, established or
adopted through popular consent”).
76. See WEBER, supra note 74, at 34.
77. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 378 (1873).
78. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 354 (13th Ed.
1997).
79. See IGNATIEFF, supra note 29, at 3.
80. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (3rd ed. 2009).
81. Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 438 (1830).
82. See Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981) (“[I]t can be said
that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State
collectively. It is to be found in the State’s constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in
its judicial decisions.”); 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12:2,
at 767‒71 (4th ed. 2009).
83. This is also the reason why numerous scholars have criticized the doctrine, fearing that it
gives judges too much discretion in determining public policy. Likewise, “[u]nder the current
public policy doctrine, judges may draw . . . on their own views of what public interest or morality
requires . . . . The power to overrule market choices granted by public policy doctrines gives courts
flexibility in administering justice, but adds a degree of uncertainty to commercial transactions.”
See, e.g., Shell, supra note 11, at 442. See also Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson, Transnational
Bankruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 329, 340 (considering the
vagueness of statutory guidelines, “courts are left to decide each case according to their own
idiosyncratic inclinations, leading to inconsistent and unpredictable results”); Moran v. Harris, 182
Cal. Rptr. 519, 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (“[J]uridical realization of the meandering nature of ‘public
policy’ necessitates judicial restraint.”). In addition, judicial consonance with public policy has
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often assessing, among multiple competing interests, which is more important—
a task constitutionally delegated to the legislature.84 As a result, courts thrust
into this situation have often been accused of legislating from the bench.85
3. Restraint on Freedom of Contract
Another potential evil implicated by an illegality dispute is the potential to
restrain parties’ freedom of contract.86 Freedom of contract is a fundamental
principle of U.S. contract law;87 it is a part of our national identity, built on
respect for individual autonomy,88 and it is reflected in the general rule that
private agreements are enforced as bargained for by the parties.89 Contracts are
generally viewed as private ordering by the parties. 90 A court’s refusal to
enforce a private agreement is considered a restraint on parties’ freedom of

been described as “a very unruly horse, . . . once get astride it you never know where it will carry
you.” Lynn C. Percival, IV, Public Policy Favoritism in the Online World: Contract Voidability
Meets the Communications Decency Act, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 165, 182 (2011) (quoting
Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294 (C.P.) 303 (1824)); but cf., Prince, supra note 5, at 169
(“The problems spring not from the use of excessive discretion by the courts in traveling new paths
because of a perceived change in public policy, but more from a failure to follow with
circumspection the path and principles which have already been laid.”).
84. See Leacock, Lotteries and Public Policy in American Law, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 37,
42, 43‒45 (2012) (“Identifying and declaring violations of public policy is a delicate, subtle, and
difficult intellectual task.”). As commented on by Justice Scalia:
[T]he main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution—or, for that matter, in
judicial interpretation of any law—is that the judges will mistake their own predilections
for the law. Avoiding this error is the hardest part of being a conscientious judge; perhaps
no conscientious judge ever succeeds entirely.
Scalia, supra note 25, at 863.
85. Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 185, 187 (2007).
86. Even the staunchest advocate of freedom of contract concedes that there are limits to that
freedom. To that extent, one can say, refusing to enforce illegal agreements will not affect freedom
of contract at all. This is definitely true in some extreme cases of highway robbery or murder for
hire. However, when the illegality is particularly subtle, it becomes incredibly difficult for a court
to draw a line, and the court has the potential to infringe upon parties’ freedom to contract. See
Yale Note, supra note 8, at 1108, 1113.
87. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 215 (2d ed. 2004).
88. Kirsten L. McCaw, Freedom of Contract Versus the Antidiscrimination Principle: A
Critical Look at the Tension Between Contractual Freedom and Antidiscrimination Provisions, 7
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 195, 198 (1996) (“The desirability of individual autonomy and economic
efficiency lies at the core of freedom of contract.”).
89. See In re McInnis, 110 P.3d 639, 644 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
90. Buckley, supra note 12, at 139 (noting that “the doctrine of illegality marks off the border
between public and private ordering”). This article does not intend to join the debate about whether
contracts are public or private.
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contract.91 Accordingly, illegality disputes effectively force the judiciary to
mark the outer boundaries of private contracting behavior.
Freedom of contract has been defended on multiple grounds.92 Respecting a
party’s freedom of contract is said to promote certainty and predictability.93 For
contracts to function effectively as a risk allocation tool fostering economic
development, parties need to be able to rely on contracts.94 Certainty of contract
provides incentives for parties to engage in investment—activities that can be
socially beneficial.95
4. Forfeiture of Property
Another concern of courts in reviewing illegal agreement disputes is the risk
of property forfeiture.96 Generally, the judicially imposed forfeiture of property
is, from a policy standpoint, disfavored.97 This attitude is reflected in the
property protection afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment98 and the Restatement’s explicit enumeration of the risk of
forfeiture as one of the factors to be assessed in resolving illegal agreement
disputes.99
In the illegal agreement dispute context, risk of property forfeiture exists
where parties have agreed to an exchange of performances in sequential order.100

91. See Eldridge v. Johnston, 245 P.2d 239, 245 (Or. 1952) (noting that free and voluntary
private contracts are “held sacred” and “shall be enforced by courts of justice”); Yale Note, supra
note 8, at 1108.
92. Volumes have been written on this topic. This article only offers a brief summary to
provide a context for discussion. For a detailed discussion on this topic, see Mark Pettit, Jr.,
Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall,” 79 B.U. L. REV. 263, 352 (1999).
93. See Miller, supra note 9, at 1496.
94. See Robert Cooter, Doing What You Say: Contracts and Economic Development, 59 ALA.
L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2008) (stating that “[c]ontractual commitment is the fundamental means for
economic coordination provided by law”); see also H. Ward Classen, Judicial Intervention in
Contractual Relationships Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Common Law, 42 S.C. L.
REV. 379, 383 (1991) (“Because allocating risks through long-term contracts is essential to accurate
planning and, thus, to the viability of a business in a free market economy, courts rarely excuse
sophisticated commercial parties from their contractual obligations.”).
95. Thorsten Beck, Legal Institutions and Economic Development 22‒24 (CentER Discussion
Paper Series No. 2010-94), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669100.
96. See infra Part III.B.2.b.iii.
97. Seaman v. State, 396 S.E.2d 525, 526 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (indicating that statutes
permitting forfeiture of property are to be strictly construed and limited); Lloyd Capital Corp. v.
Pat Henchar, Inc., 80 N.Y.2d 124, 128 (1992) (noting that “[a]s a general rule . . . forfeitures by
operation of law are disfavored, particularly where a defaulting party seeks to raise illegality as ‘a
sword for personal gain rather than a shield for the public good’”) (quoting Charlebois v. J.M.
Weller Assocs., Inc., 531 N.E.2d 1288, 1292 (N.Y. 1988)).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
99. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 14, § 178(2)(b), at 6.
100. See HILLMAN, supra note 87, at 218. See also Benjamin E. Hermalin et al., Chapter on
the Law & Economics of Contracts, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, at 4 (2006),
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For example, A and B agree to engage in an illegal transaction. Party A performs
first and then B refuses to perform. When A sues to recover from B, the court’s
refusal to enforce the agreement due to illegality would excuse B from any
obligation and result in A forfeiting property or the value of his services.101
5. Corruption of Morals
Courts are also exceedingly concerned about aiding or facilitating any
transactions that would encourage corruption,102 and are especially vigilant
against aiding or facilitating any transactions that would encourage a corruption
of morals.103 Courts’ concerns with respect to corruption are well-founded
considering its remaining prevalence, despite universal condemnation.104
Corruption imposes many costs on societies.105 It interferes with government’s
ability to perform efficiently,106 undermining the legitimacy of, and the people’s
confidence in, government.107 As a result, the law values honest service by
public servants.108

http://www.econ.uiuc.edu/~avillami/course-files/contract_law_handbook_article.pdf (last visted
Feb. 24, 2015).
101. See, e.g., Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 263 (1880); Farbenfabriken Bayer A.G.
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 307 F.2d 207, 210 (3d Cir. 1962) (“In such cases the aid of the court is
denied, not for the benefit of the defendant, but because public policy demands that it should be
denied without regard to the interests of individual parties.”) (quoting Cont’l Wall Paper Co. v.
Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 262 (1909)); Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension
Co., Inc., 572 P.2d 412, 414 (Wyo. 1977) (holding that in consideration of the silence of the
legislature, the defendant was not obligated to pay for illegal gambling debt).
102. See e.g., Oscanyan, 103 U.S. at 273 (commenting that “[p]ersonal influence to be
exercised over an officer of government in the procurement of contracts, . . . is not a vendible article
in our system of laws and morals”).
103. Id. at 277; Bartle v. Nutt, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 184, 188 (1830).
104. David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach; The C2
Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 593, 595 (2000) (stating that “even
through the 1990s . . . corruption bec[a]me one of the most important policy issues in the
international economy”).
105. Id. at 596‒99.
106. Id. at 612.
107. Id. at 594.
108. See John D. Feerick, Toward a Model Whistleblowing Law, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 585,
594 (1992) (stating “we expect . . . public servants conform to a higher set of standards than simply
avoiding breaking the law, a model law must account for the problems of corruption, conflict of
interest, abuse of position, gross waste of funds and gross mismanagement in order to effectuate
this goal”); Joshua A. Kobrin, Betraying Honest Services: Theories of Trust and Betrayal Applied
to the Mail Fraud Statute and § 1346, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 779, 781 (2006) (noting the
judiciary’s recognition of congressional objectives in amending fraudulent mail practices in the
early twentieth century to impose a broader “honest services” duty upon public employees).
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6. Incentives to Engage in More Illegal, Fraudulent, or Opportunistic
Behavior
Courts are also concerned about another evil: creating incentives for parties
to engage in more illegal or other socially undesirable conduct such as fraud or
opportunistic behavior.109 The general rule of non-enforcement is often justified
on the basis of deterring illegal behavior.110 However, under certain
circumstances, non-enforcement may encourage, rather than deter illegal
behavior.111 Courts have often commented on this unfortunate aspect of
pernicious actors engaging in opportunistic behavior with the expectation of
taking advantage of the illegality defense in order to obtain a windfall.112
Similar to the property forfeiture context, opportunistic behavior is more
likely to exist when parties to an illegal agreement perform their obligations
sequentially.113 Courts’ refusal to enforce an agreement due to illegality will
sometimes result in forfeiture of property for Party A, but a windfall for Party
B.114 These situations are ripe for opportunistic behavior, especially where an
illegal transaction generates profit, and the parties dispute about how to divide
the profits arising out of the illegal transaction.115
7. Injury to Other Miscellaneous Public Interests
Cases show that there are multiple public interests that courts seek to protect
when resolving an illegality dispute, as much varied as the laws allegedly

109. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520‒21 (1959) (commenting that “the courts are
to be guided by the overriding general policy, as Mr. Justice Holmes put it, ‘of preventing people
from getting other people’s property for nothing when they purport to be buying it’”) (quoting
Cont’l Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 271 (1909) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)); Gates v. Rivers Constr. Co., Inc., 515 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Alaska 1973) (expressing
concern that a non-enforcement remedy might encourage employers to “knowingly . . . employ
[illegal] aliens and then, with impunity, . . . refuse [to] pay them for their services”);
Nizamuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret, Inc., 399 N.Y.S.2d 854, 857 (App. Div. 1977) (ordering, under
a claim of unjust enrichment, recovery in favor of the plaintiff because the defendant was
manipulating the system through immigration laws would likely continue to engage in the same
conduct).
110. See McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669‒70 (1899).
111. See infra, Part III.B.2.b.
112. See, e.g., Kosuga, 358 U.S. at 520‒21; McMullen, 174 U.S. at 669.
113. George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 941, 954‒55 (1992).
114. See, e.g., Parente v. Pirozzoli, 866 A.2d 629, 638 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005). The court noted:
Although the end result of holding the 1995 partnership agreement illegal may be to
allow the defendant to receive a windfall at the plaintiff’s expense, our Supreme Court
has stated “that this result is common, and . . . necessary in many cases in which contracts
are deemed unenforceable on the grounds of furthering overriding public policies.”
Id. (quoting Solomon v. Gilmore, 731 A.2d 280, 293 (Conn. 1999) (alterations in original)).
115. See infra Part III.B.2.c.
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violated by the content of the agreements.116 For example, in discussing the
validity of the contracts in restraint of trade, the U.S. Supreme Court identified
as evils “the injury to the public by being deprived of the restricted party’s
industry . . . [and] the injury to the party himself by being precluded from
pursuing his occupation and thus being prevented from supporting himself and
his family.”117
In another case addressing the validity of contractual waivers of liability by
common carriers, the U.S. Supreme Court identified the public policy
underlying the common carrier law as promoting the utmost care and diligence
in providing safe transportation to the public.118
B. Courts’ Choices Consistent with the Lesser Evil Principle
The following cases show how courts have by and large made their choices
consistent with the lesser evil principle. To resolve illegal agreement disputes,
courts typically need to address two questions: the threshold question of whether
the agreement implicated is illegal; and second, what form of remedy is
proper.119 Courts have multiple remedies to choose from depending on
plaintiffs’ theories.120 Even though courts have not explicitly adopted the lesser
evil principle to support their choices, their analyses strongly suggest their
decisions are grounded in the principle.121
1. Threshold Question of Illegality: Limiting the Scope of Illegality as the
Lesser Evil
Courts, addressing the threshold question of illegality, have attempted to limit
its scope in multiple ways. First, courts generally presume legality,122 requiring

116. See, e.g., Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 70 (1873) (noting
public policy arguments against agreements restraining trade); Nizamuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret,
Inc., 399 N.Y.S.2d 854, 857 (App. Div. 1997) (citing public interests in discouraging employers
from deceptive practices); Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., 572 P.2d 412, 414 (Wyo.
1977) (indicating a public interest in discouraging illegal gambling).
117. Oregon Steam Nav. Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 68.
118. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 378 (1873).
119. See Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 163 n.4 (citing Furmston, supra note 10, at 267).
120. See infra Parts III.B.2.c.i‒ii.
121. Over one-hundred years ago, one scholar commented on the possible injustice of
generally applying the non-enforcement rule. The scholar observed courts’ willingness to develop
various limitations on the general rule and continued: “While these limitations on the general
doctrine have considerably lessened its evils, they furnish no relief in many cases in which the rule
works a palpable injustice . . . . ” Harvard Note 1913, supra note 58, at 739.
122. See Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408 (1977) (noting that the “general rule of
construction presumes the legality and enforceability of contracts, ambiguously worded contracts
should not be interpreted to render them illegal and unenforceable where the wording lends itself
to a logically acceptable construction that renders them legal and enforceable”) (internal citation
omitted).
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that the defense of illegality be affirmatively pled.123 Courts have also tried to
assess how closely connected the agreement seeking to be enforced is to the
unlawfulness of forbidden acts, often referred to as the collateral agreement
rule.124 Another way that courts have attempted to limit the scope of illegality
is by narrowly interpreting the law allegedly violated.125
For example, in an antebellum case, a group of slave traders tried to avoid
payment of notes given as part of the purchase price.126 Even though the
Constitution of the State of Mississippi prohibited the sale of slaves imported
from other states, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the prohibition and
enforced the sales agreements, finding that the sales agreements were not invalid
until the legislature had acted.127
By adopting a presumption against illegality and narrowly construing
illegality, courts avoid the greater evil of unduly impinging on parties’ freedom
of contract and the resulting uncertainty.128 This narrow construction allows
courts to avoid a host of other evils that often accompany a non-enforcement
choice, such as forfeiture of property and incentives for opportunistic
behavior.129
2. Courts’ Choices of Remedies
Upon a finding of illegality, courts have multiple options at their disposal.
They can refuse to enforce an illegal agreement, or they can enforce an illegal
agreement despite its illegality.130 For example, if a plaintiff seeks to recover

123. Brearton v. De Witt, 170 N.E. 119, 120 (N.Y. 1930).
124. See, e.g., Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 551 (1902); Armstrong v.
Am. Exch. Nat’l Bank, 133 U.S. 433, 467‒68 (1890).
125. See, e.g., Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 501‒02 (1841); De Valengin’s
Adm’rs v. Duffy, 39 U.S. 282, 291 (1840) (refusing to find a contract illegal even though the parties
lied about property ownership in order to get reimbursement from another government during a
war).
126. Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 497.
127. Id. at 500‒01.
128. Cont’l Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co. 212 U.S. 227, 270‒71 (1909) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (stating that “because the policy of not furthering the purposes of the trust is less
important than the policy of preventing people from getting other people’s property for nothing
when they purport to be buying it . . . it makes no difference whether he is glad or sorry for the
result”); Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 116‒17; Yale Note, supra note 8, at 1108 (pointing out that
the non-enforcement rule “conflict[s] with the more basic policy of preserving the inviolability of
contracts”).
129. See D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 236 U.S 165, 176 (1915) (pointing out
that individuals may be prompted by selfish motives to attack the legality of a seller organization);
Wade, supra note 10, at 55 (“To a defrauder, the knowledge that the law will permit him to keep
ill-gotten gains will be an incentive to induce another to participate in an illegal contract.”).
130. See infra Part III.B.2.a‒b.
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money paid under the illegal transaction under quasi-contractual theories, courts
can deny recovery or allow recovery despite the illegality.131
Courts have developed multiple theories to give them the flexibility to choose
remedies, adopting rules such as the distinction between malum in se and malum
prohibitum,132 the principle of in pari delicto,133 the collateral agreement
doctrine,134 the protected class doctrine,135 failure of consideration,136
rescission,137 and unjust enrichment.138 These theories provide courts with the
flexibility to grant or deny relief as called for by the facts of a particular case.139
Courts have by and large followed the lesser evil principle and applied the rules
in a way to achieve a consistent result: avoiding the greater evils.
a. The Non-Enforcement Remedy as the Lesser Evil
The following sets forth some examples where courts have refused to enforce
the terms of an illegal agreement to avoid some greater evil. These cases can be
roughly grouped into three representative scenarios: courts’ avoidance of
undermining the legitimacy or the law and the court; courts’ avoidance of
incentivizing fraud and corruption; and courts’ avoidance of undermining other
important public interests.140
i. Scenario One: To Avoid Undermining the Legitimacy of the Law and
the Court
Under this scenario, courts generally have denied plaintiffs relief because it
would have in some form aided plaintiffs’ violation of law. For example, in
Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore,141 the plaintiff helped the defendant
negotiate an agreement that state law expressly prohibited.142 When the

131. See infra Part III.B.2.c‒d.
132. See, e.g., Lloyd Capital Corp. v. Pat Henchar, Inc., 603 N.E.2d 246, 248 (N.Y. 1992);
John E. Rosasco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen Dairy Co., 276 N.Y. 274, 280 (1937); Yale Note, supra
note 8, at 1108.
133. See Note, In Pari Delicto, Under the Federal Securities Laws: Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 345, 347 (1987) (discussing the common law defense
and its specific application in securities litigation).
134. See Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 159.
135. See id. at 156.
136. See, e.g., N.Y. & Pa. Co. v. Cunard Coal Co., 132 A. 828, 831 (Pa. 1926).
137. See Harvard Note 1913, supra note 58, at 740.
138. See Wade, supra note 10, at 52‒53 (discussing different reasons that the courts have used
to support their decisions to allow or refuse recovery where there is a finding of illegality).
139. Id. at 62.
140. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all possible factual scenarios that can
implicate the illegality issue. The scenarios merely provide selected examples for the purpose of
discussion.
141. 130 U.S. 396 (1889).
142. Id. at 411.
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defendant failed to pay the plaintiff, the plaintiff sued to recover the payment.143
The Court found that the statute in question explicitly provided that the contract
was “null and void.”144 Distinguishing between malum in se and malum
prohibitum, the Court refused to enforce the contract because “there can be no
legal remedy for which is itself illegal,” and doing so would have helped the
plaintiff to “obtain the fruits of an unlawful bargain.”145
Non-enforcement in this situation leaves the plaintiffs without any relief. This
can deter the plaintiffs from engaging in illegal transactions in the future.
However, denying relief in these situations carries a price. The windfall retained
by defendants may also create incentives to engage in more illegal activities or
opportunistic behavior.146 It places a constraint upon private parties’ freedom
of contract. In addition, it potentially results in the forfeiture of property.147 For
example, in Gibbs, the plaintiff was not compensated for his services.148
Nonetheless, the courts deem non-enforcement the lesser evil because the
plaintiffs in these cases are seeking the courts’ assistance in advancing illegal
agreements.149 Aiding a plaintiff in his or her violation of the law would
undermine the legitimacy of the law and the court.150
ii. Scenario Two: To Avoid Incentives to Engage in Fraud and
Corruption.
The Court in the following case avoided the greater evil of encouraging fraud
and corruption by refusing to enforce the illegal agreement. In Bartle v. Nutt,151
the parties disputed a settlement of accounts involving an agreement with a

143. Id. at 403.
144. Id. at 411‒12.
145. Id. at 412 (quoting Russell v. De Grand, 15 Mass. 35, 39 (1818)).
146. See supra Part III.A.6.
147. See Gibbs, 130 U.S. at 411.
148. Id. at 403‒04.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 146‒47.
150. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 81‒82 (1982) (refusing to enforce
an agreement on the grounds that to hold otherwise would foster conduct that the antitrust laws
specifically forbade); Awotin v. Atlas Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi., 295 U.S. 209, 214 (1935) (refusing
to enforce an agreement between the bank and the customer where the bank agreed to repurchase
accrued bonds at par upon maturity, violating a state statute deemed to protect against perilous
outcomes in the interest of depositors and the public); Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
439, 443‒45, 448‒49 (1872) (refusing to enforce a promissory note where the only consideration
for the note was war bonds issued by the confederate states for the purpose of supporting the war
against the federal government during the Civil War and noting that the Court’s authority came
from the Constitution and it could never enforce a contract that would aid or impair the supremacy
of the Constitution); Patton v. Nicholson, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 204, 207 (1818) (refusing to enforce
a contract where an American citizen issued an illegal license, or pass, from the enemy to be used
on board an American vessel during the War of 1812).
151. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 184 (1830).
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public officer who engaged in fraud.152 One partner sued the other partner “to
account for and to pay . . . one-half of [the] loss sustained by an unsuccessful
attempt to impose spurious vouchers on the government.”153 The Court
commented that “a judicial tribunal will degrade itself by an exertion of its
powers, by shifting the loss from the one to the other; or to equalise [sic] the
benefits or bur[d]ens which may have resulted by the violation of every principle
of morals and of laws.”154
The non-enforcement remedy arguably impaired the parties’ freedom of
contract. In addition, it encouraged opportunistic behavior because defendants
in these types of cases retained a windfall as a result of the courts’ refusal to
enforce the agreements. The Court apparently made its choice based on a
concern of aiding or facilitating any transactions that would encourage fraud or
corruption.155
iii. Scenario Three: To Avoid Undermining Other Important Public
Interests
In this category, the Court refused to enforce attempted contractual waivers
for public policy reasons. In doing so, the Court avoided the greater evil of
allowing private parties to override legislative intent to protect public safety.156
For example, in R.R. Co. v. Lockwood,157 the Court struck down a contractual
provision attempting to exempt the railroad company from its own
negligence.158 Injured while traveling on a stock train, Lockwood sued the New

152. Id. at 184‒85.
153. Id. at 185, 188.
154. Id. at 189; See also McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 640–44, 669 (1899) (refusing
to enforce an agreement to share in profits generated from public works construction where the
parties engaged in fraud in the bidding process to obtain the projects); Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103
U.S. 261, 271‒72 (1880) (refusing to enforce an agreement where defendant agreed to pay sales
commission to the Turkish government in return for plaintiff’s influence over an agent of the
Turkish government). The Oscanyan Court noted:
The contract was a corrupt one, [] corrupt in its origin and corrupting in its tendencies,
the services stipulated and rendered were prohibited by considerations of morality and
policy which should prevail at all times and in all countries, and without which fidelity
to public trusts would be a matter of bargain and sale, and not of duty.
Id.
155. See, e.g., Oscanyan, 103 U.S. at 273 (commenting that “[p]ersonal influence to be
exercised over an officer of government in the procurement of contracts . . . is not a vendible article
in our system of laws and morals”).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236, 239 (1952); Adams Express
Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 509–12 (1913); Hart v. Pa. R.R. Co., 112 U.S. 331, 338, 340–41
(1884); Bank of Ky. v. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174, 181, 183 (1876); R.R. Co. v. Lockwood,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 359‒60 (1873).
157. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873).
158. Id. at 383‒84.
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York Central Railroad Company seeking damages resulting from his injury. 159
The railroad company asserted the contractual waiver as a defense.160
The Court upheld the trial judge’s decision to strike down the waiver.161 In
supporting its decision, the Court commented that the fundamental principles of
common carrier, such as a railroad company, law were “to secure the utmost
care and diligence in the performance of their important duties—an object
essential to the welfare of every civilized community.”162 The Court explicitly
dismissed the defense that non-enforcement would intrude on the private right
to contract, concluding that if a common carrier were at liberty to waive those
“essential duties,” it would subvert “the very object of the law.”163
b. The Enforcement Remedy as the Lesser Evil
Courts’ focus on the consequences of their choices has led to the enforcement
of illegal agreements in many cases, sometimes explicitly and sometimes as a
matter of fact.164 In the following scenarios, the Court weighed the adverse
consequences of its choices, and chose to enforce the agreements despite the
illegality.
i. Scenario One: To Avoid Fraud
In this scenario, the Court chose to enforce illegal agreements to avoid
encouraging fraud. In Bein v. Heath,165 Richard Bein and his wife, Mary Bein,
sued “to enjoin proceedings under a writ of seizure and sale . . . by the appellee,
Mary Heath, to sell . . . [Mary Bein’s] property” that she had given to secure two
notes drawn by her in favor of her husband.166 The plaintiffs alleged that these
notes “were given for a loan obtained by Richard Bein, the husband, for his own
use” and that under the Louisiana laws at that time, “the mortgage of the wife,
and her promise to pay [his] debt, or to make her property responsible, [was] not
binding, but void.”167
The Court enforced the mortgage despite the agreement’s illegality under state
law.168 Supporting its decision, the Court noted that Mrs. Bein regularly paid
the interest for the loan, “the house and lot were insured, and the policy [was]
annually assigned for the benefit” of Mary Health.169 These facts showed that

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 359.
Id.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 378, 379‒81.
See infra Parts III.B.2.b.i–iv.
47 U.S. (6 How.) 228 (1848).
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id. at 241, 248.
Id. at 247.
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the plaintiff deliberately committed fraud.170 Accordingly, it can be inferred that
the Court’s decision was based on concern that non-enforcement would “enable
the wife to practise [sic] the grossest frauds with impunity.”171
ii. Scenario Two: To Avoid the “Grossest Injustice”
In the following situation, the Supreme Court chose to enforce an agreement
despite its illegality because the plaintiff had no choice due to circumstances
beyond his control.
In Thorington v. Smith,172 the plaintiff, Thorington, sold a parcel of land
situated in Montgomery, Alabama, to the defendant for $45,000.173 The
defendant paid for most of the purchase with Confederate notes and a promissory
note for the remaining balance.174 While the Court’s review commenced after
the conclusion of the Civil War, the agreement was made in a Southern state
during the life of the Confederacy.175 Federal notes of the United States were
not in circulation in Alabama at that time, nor were silver and gold coins.176 The
only common currency available for business transactions was treasury notes
issued by the Confederacy, which became useless upon the conclusion of the
Civil War.177 Thorington, the seller, sued to enforce a vendor’s lien upon the
land sold, requesting the balance of the stipulated purchase-money in U.S.
currency.178 Smith, the buyer, argued on the grounds that the agreement was to
pay in Confederate notes, which were illegal under U.S. law, so U.S. courts
could not grant relief.179
The Court held that the agreement was in fact enforceable because the notes
were used in “the business transactions of many millions of people” and
represented “transactions in the ordinary course of civil society.”180 Justice
Miller later explained his reluctant enforcement of the agreement in Thorington,
describing the ruling as “necessary . . . to prevent the grossest injustice in
reference to transactions of millions of people for several years in duration.”181

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
75 U.S. (5 Wall.) 1 (1868).
Id. at 1‒2.
Id. at 2‒3.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 1‒2.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2‒3.
Id. at 4‒5.
Id. at 11‒12.
Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 439, 449 (1872).
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iii. Scenario Three: To Avoid the Twin Evils of Forfeiture of Property
and Opportunism
In the following line of cases, courts chose to enforce agreements despite their
illegality to avoid encouraging illegal and opportunistic behavior and the forced
forfeiture of property.
In Kelly v. Kosuga,182 a seller of onions sued his buyer for failure to pay for
the full purchase price.183 The buyer asserted the illegality defense, alleging that
the seller was part of the illegal trust.184 The lower court granted the seller’s
motion to strike the illegality defense.185 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the lower court’s decision.186 Justice Brennan justified the enforcement
remedy because the transaction was a “completed sale of onions at a fair price”
and giving the sale full legal effect would not result in the Court’s enforcement
of an act in violation of the law.187 The Court commented that as long as the
Court itself would not be enforcing the precise conduct made unlawful by law,
the courts should follow the overriding general policy “of preventing people
from getting other people’s property for nothing when they purport to be buying
it.”188
In Gates v. River Construction Co.,189 plaintiff employee sued his employer
for unpaid wages.190 The employment agreement was to induce an alien to enter
the United States without the requisite governmental approval in violation of
federal immigration laws.191 Defendant employer asserted illegality as a
defense.192 The trial court found in favor of the employer.193
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the lower court’s
decision.194 The court commented that allowing the employer, who knowingly
participated in and promoted an illegal transaction, to profit at the expense of the

182. 358 U.S. 516 (1959).
183. Id. at 516.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 517.
186. Id. at 521.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 520‒21 (quoting Cont’l Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227,
271 (1908); see also D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165, 172‒73, 178
(1915) (enforcing a purchase and sale agreement despite the fact that the seller was part of an illegal
trust); Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 79, 85‒86 (1851) (enforcing a contract for a sale of
slaves even though the agreement violated the law, and pointing out that the defendant buyer was
aware of the violation of the law and was “seeking to add to his breach of the law the injustice of
retaining the negroes without paying for them”).
189. 515 P.2d 1020 (Alaska 1973).
190. Id. at 1021.
191. Id. at 1020‒21.
192. Id. at 1021.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1024.
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employee would be “a harsh and undesirable consequence of the doctrine that
illegal contracts are not to be enforced.”195 The court noted that applying the
non-enforcement rule would encourage employers to engage in the very same
conduct sought to be prevented if employers could “knowingly employ
excludable aliens and then, with impunity, to refuse to pay them for their
services.”196
By choosing to enforce the agreements, courts avoid the greater evil of
forfeiture of property and opportunistic behavior even though granting relief
effectively sanctioned plaintiffs’ violation of the law.197 Between a “clever
scoundrel” and a regular criminal, courts seem to have decided to tolerate a
regular criminal as the lesser evil.198
iv. Scenario Four: To Avoid Undermining the Law
This scenario exemplifies the Supreme Court’s enforcement of an illegal
agreement because employing the non-enforcement doctrine would have in fact
undermined the purpose of the law violated by the agreement. For example, in
A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp.,199 the plaintiff buyer sued
defendant seller for breaching an option agreement to purchase defendant’s
treasury stock in exchange for money received by defendant from proceeds of a
previous sale of treasury stock.200 Defendant denied liability upon the ground,
inter alia, that the agreement violated a securities law, requiring the treasury
stock of the defendant corporation to be registered for sale.201 Defendant alleged
that it did not register the stocks in dispute prior to its sale to the plaintiff—a
fact, alleged by defendant, known by the plaintiff to have rendered the
transaction illegal.202
Despite the illegality of the agreement, the Supreme Court enforced the
agreement because the violated statute was designed to protect investors by
requiring publication of certain information concerning securities before

195. Id. at 1022.
196. Id.
197. In some cases, courts allowed recovery under quasi-contractual principles such as unjust
enrichment. See supra Part III.B.2. However, recovery under quasi-contractual theories in those
cases sometimes amount to full enforcement of the illegal agreement depending on the types of
agreements. See supra Part III.B.3. For example, if a plaintiff is seeking to recover the purchase
price of a sales agreement, awarding said plaintiff the purchase price under unjust enrichment or
restitution, thereby enforcing the agreement, will in fact accomplish the same result. The difference
is mostly semantic.
198. Harvard Note 1913, supra note 58, 740 (commenting that “[t]he reluctance of the courts
to adjust the rights of criminals is hardly a sufficient reason for allowing clever scoundrels to
defraud their victims whenever they can involve them in crime”).
199. 312 U.S. 38 (1941).
200. Id. at 39.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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offering them for sale.203 The Court found that refusing to enforce the agreement
would have actually hindered the purpose of the securities law.204
c. Allowing Recovery Despite Illegality as the Lesser Evil
In some cases, courts have allowed recovery even though the agreement was
illegal and not enforceable. Under this scenario, courts have rested their choices
on quasi-contractual theories such as restitution, rescission, and unjust
enrichment. Recovery in these situations is aimed at avoiding particularized,
case specific, greater evils.
i. Scenario One: To Avoid Fraud
In Brooks v. Martin,205 plaintiff Martin and defendant Brooks formed a
partnership primarily aimed at purchasing land warrants, prior to their issuance,
from soldiers pledged to them under a law passed by Congress.206 The statute,
in order to protect soldiers against malevolent land brokers and others who
would take advantage of returning soldiers, prohibited any sale or agreement
related to those warrants which have not been issued.207 There was no dispute
that the partnership was illegal.208
After Martin sold Brooks his interest in the partnership for a small amount,
Martin realized that Brooks had concealed from him the true financial status of
the partnership and sued to set aside the sale of his partnership interest, and for
an accounting and division of the illegal partnership profits.209 Brooks had in
his possession lands, money, notes, mortgages, and the profits of the partnership,
all of which comprised of the original capital advanced by Martin.210 Brooks
asserted, inter alia, illegality of the partnership business as a defense.211
The Court, finding Brooks to have obtained possession and control of the
proceeds by hiding the true financial status of the partnership, rejected the
illegality defense and granted the relief that Martin requested.212 The Court,

203. Id. at 42‒43
204. Id. at 43; see also CORBIN, supra note 1, at § 1540, at 833 (“If a bargain is illegal, not
because a performance promised under it is an illegal performance, but only because the party
promising it is forbidden by statute or ordinance to do so, the prohibition is aimed at that party only
and he is the only wrongdoer.”); Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 156 (discussing the protected class
doctrine).
205. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 70 (1864).
206. Id. at 71.
207. Id. at 72, 73‒75.
208. Id. at 79.
209. Id. at 70‒71, 82.
210. Id. at 70‒71, 81.
211. Id. at 70.
212. Id. at 80.
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noting the completion of the illegal transaction, ostensibly based its decision
upon finding a fraudulent breach of a fiduciary duty Brooks’ owed to Martin.213
Reading between the lines, one senses that the Court was clearly concerned
about fairness, i.e., it would have been unfair if Martin were denied relief.214 In
addition, if the Court were to deny Martin relief, it would have permitted Brooks
to retain the profits generated from the illegal partnership.215 Even though
granting the relief sanctioned the illegal partnership and amounted to full judicial
enforcement of an illegal agreement, the Court avoided the greater evil of
rewarding fraud and forfeiting property.216
ii. Scenario Two: To Avoid Opportunistic Behavior and Forfeiture of
Property
In this scenario, courts have justified recovery under quasi-contractual
theories, aimed at deterring illegal conduct and to avoid the twin evils of
forfeiture and opportunism.
In Nizamuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret, Inc.,217 the plaintiff sued to recover
payment for work completed despite relevant immigration laws forbidding his
employment.218 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, considered
the existing policy dilemma—a plaintiff who knowingly violated U.S.
immigration laws seeking redress, and an equally culpable defendant who
manipulated illegal immigrants to work for him.219 The court reluctantly
concluded that the only equitable option was to allow recovery under a quasicontractual claim of unjust enrichment,220 believing that to deny plaintiff’s relief

213. Id. at 87.
214. Id. at 80 (finding it “difficult to perceive how the statute, enacted for the benefit of the
soldier, is to be rendered any more effective by leaving all [profits] in the hands of Brooks, instead
of requiring him to execute justice as between himself and his partner”).
215. See id. at 78‒79, 86 (noting that Martin advanced the money for the purchase of the land
warrants, and that his “share of the profits were $30,000, for which Brooks gave him substantially
nothing”).
216. See id. at 82‒83; see also Fellner v. Marino, 158 N.Y.S.2d 24, 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956)
(allowing plaintiff to recover the money paid under an illegal contract despite the plaintiff’s
knowledge of illegality). The Fellner court commented: “Let it once be known that a fraud doer
can escape the consequences of his fraud by insinuating into his remarks to the defrauded person
some vague element of ultimate illegality, there would be no way in which to protect defrauded
persons.” Id. See also Duval v. Wellman, 124 N.Y. 156, 163 (1891) (commenting that “[t]o decide
that money could not be recovered back would be to establish the rules by which the defendant and
others of the same ilk could ply their trade and secure themselves in the fruits of their illegal
transactions”).
217. 399 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1977).
218. Id. at 855.
219. Id. at 856.
220. Id. at 857.
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would encourage the defendant, and others, to engage in the same illegal
conduct.221
The grant of recovery in the above scenario, as exemplified in
Nizamuddowlah, effectively rewards plaintiffs who also present themselves to
court with unclean hands. Even though the Nizamuddowlah court allowed
recovery under a claim of unjust enrichment and recovery essentially enforced
the illegal employment agreement, by allowing recovery the court avoided the
greater evil of encouraging opportunistic behavior and accompanying forfeiture
of property.222
d. Denying Recovery as the Lesser Evil
In some cases, courts denied recovery where plaintiffs sought a return of
money paid under an illegal agreement.223 Denying recovery in those cases
allows courts to deter illegal behavior, opportunistic behavior, and to avoid
forfeiture of property.
i. Scenario One: To Avoid Aiding Corruption
In Sinnair v. Le Roy,224 defendant, in exchange for $450, promised to procure
a beer license for plaintiff or return the money.225 When defendant was unable
to obtain the license and refused to return the money, plaintiff sued to recover
the money.226 The lower court allowed recovery of the money.227 On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Washington reversed.228 The court noted that evidence
presented “contains the germ of possible corruption,” and the “parties
contemplated the use of means other than legal to accomplish the end
desired.”229 Accordingly, the court was unwilling to “aid in the furtherance of
an illegal transaction.”230

221. See id.; see also McCauley v. Michael, 256 N.W.2d 491, 501 (Minn. 1977) (denying
enforcement of an illegal agreement, but allowing recovery of $500 paid to purchase shares of
corporate stock under the illegal agreement); Hobbs v. Boatright, 93 S.W. 934, 937 (Mo. 1906)
(holding that to allow plaintiff recovery serves the underlying public policy better than withholding
relief because of the illegality of the contract).
222. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Nizamuddowlah, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 855. These cases are different from the cases
where plaintiffs sought to enforce the terms of illegal agreements.
224. 270 P.2d 800 (Wash. 1954).
225. Id. at 800.
226. Id. at 801.
227. Id. at 802.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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ii. Scenario Two: To Avoid the Twin Evils of Property Forfeiture and
Opportunism
In Arcidi v. National Association of Government Employees,231 the plaintiff
entered into a consulting agreement with the defendant.232 Under the agreement,
plaintiff, in exchange for $250,000, agreed to “secure the approval of a proposed
real estate development by” a governmental agency.233 The transacted
agreement was illegal, however, because compensation conditioned upon a
pending governmental decision violated state law.234
Subsequent to the approval of the project, defendant paid plaintiff $200,000,
but refused to pay the remaining $50,000 balance.235 When the plaintiff sued
the defendant to recover the remaining $50,000, the defendant asserted the
illegality defense against enforcement and counterclaimed seeking to recover the
$200,000 already paid.236
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, accepting
the defendant’s illegality defense argument and ordered the plaintiff to return
the $200,000 paid.237 The decision for both issues, the illegality defense and the
counterclaim, was affirmed on appeal.238
Upon review by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the court upheld the
illegality defense, denying plaintiff relief related to the remaining $50,000
payment.239 However, the court reversed the lower courts’ decision with respect
to defendant’s counterclaim, finding that public interest weighed against
granting defendant’s relief, and no other equitable consideration justified
allowing the defendant to recover the $200,000 already paid to the plaintiff.240
If the court were to return to the defendant funds previously paid, it would have
resulted in the compulsory forfeiture of the value bestowed upon defendant by
plaintiff’s consulting services, creating a windfall for the defendant. By denying

231. 856 N.E. 2d 167 (Mass. 2006).
232. Id. at 169.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 171.
236. Id. at 169.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 170.
239. Id. at 174.
240. Id. The Arcidi court’s application of the non-enforcement rule has the same effect as the
cases where courts enforced an illegal agreement or allowed recovery in favor of a party who sought
payment for services or goods under the illegal agreement. Ironically, the two apparently
contradictory rulings achieve the same result—allowing the party who provided services or goods
to be paid. The courts avoided the twin evils of forfeiture of property and encouraging opportunistic
behavior by applying two seemingly inconsistent rules. See id. Still, both rulings are consistent
with the application of the lesser evil standard.
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recovery under these circumstances, the court avoided the greater twin evils of
forfeiture of property and opportunism.241
IV. REASONS FOR THE EXPLICIT ADOPTION OF THE LESSER EVIL PRINCIPLE
The current rule of non-enforcement, and its corresponding factually distinct
exceptions, fails to adequately provide any clarity in this important area of
contract law. In this era of increasing business regulations, clarity concerning
the underlying principle of resolving illegal agreement disputes will usher in
greater certainty and predictability to the marketplace.242 Courts should
explicitly adopt the lesser evil principle when adjudicating illegal agreement
disputes for multiple reasons. Explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle will
provide better guidance to courts when adjudicating these difficult disputes. It
will lead to more consistent application of the standard, and it will not be a
difficult task considering the courts have by and large been following the
principle when adjudicating these cases. Finally, a clearer standard is necessary
because illegal agreement disputes of the future are likely to become more
complicated due to increasing business regulations.
A. The Current Rules Fail to Guide Courts Adjudicating Illegality Disputes
The current general rule of non-enforcement and its multiple exceptions have
resulted in a confusing body of case law as illegality disputes can arise in myriad
factual contexts. Generally, the application of the non-enforcement rule is
considered necessary to deter illegal transactions, but in many cases, nonenforcement actually creates incentives to engage in more illegal or fraudulent
conduct.243
The current formulation imposing a general rule of non-enforcement simply
is an inadequate tool, a blunt instrument attempting to capture a myriad of factual
complexities utilizing only a few decrepit principles when their application is
difficult, if not impossible, to apply. 244 As a result, these feeble principles are
not serviceable to courts in their efforts to balance multiple competing interests.
In fact, the current rules actually become obstacles that courts feel compelled to
overcome in order to avoid injustice under the facts of a particular case.245
This lack of clarity may have also led to some inconsistent rulings among
courts. For example, in a line of cases dealing with sales agreements that

241. See id. at 173 (noting that adopting defendant’s position would make it too easy “for
organizations to reap the benefits of illegal contracts when it is convenient, while deflecting the
consequences onto agents and third parties when it is not”).
242. Miller, supra note 9 at 1496.
243. See supra Part III.B.2.a.ii.
244. See Badawi, supra note 19, at 487; see also Harvard Note 1913, supra note 58, at 739‒40
(commenting that the doctrine of in pari delicto is “so much broader than the legitimate scope of
the policy that it would be well to discard it altogether”).
245. Harvard Note 1913, supra note 58 at 739‒40.
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violated antitrust laws, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed itself twice within
thirteen years.246 Initially, in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.,247 the Court
enforced a sales agreement despite the plaintiff seller’s role in an illegal trust.248
Seven years later, in Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co.,249
arising out of an almost identical fact pattern, the Court reversed its position and
refused to enforce a sales agreement in favor of the plaintiff seller.250 Six years
after Continental Wall Paper, the Court changed its mind yet again in DR Wilder
Manufacturing Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co.,251 unanimously ordering the
enforcement of a sales agreement despite its violation of antitrust laws.252
One may wonder whether this change of heart would have occurred had the
Continental Wall Paper Court focused on looking for the choice that caused the
lesser evil. Justice Holmes, joined by three other dissenting justices, opined that
“the policy of not furthering the purposes of the trust is less important than the
policy of preventing people from getting other people’s property for nothing
when they purport to be buying it.”253 Justice Holmes’ dissent in essence
suggests that enforcing the agreement would have been the lesser evil in that
case. Had the lesser evil principle been explicitly recognized, the majority may
have enforced the agreement despite its illegality (as it did six years later).
B. The Lesser Evil Principle Will Help Courts Focus Their Analyses and Lead
to More Certainty and Predictability
The strength of the lesser evil principle is its acceptance of the complexities
giving rise to a particular dispute.254 Instead of trying to fashion a standard for
each case, an impossible task, the principle directs courts to focus on what is
really at stake—the consequences of their decisions. While explicitly adopting
the principle will not render these disputes any easier to adjudicate,255 it will
allow courts to better focus their analyses on their task at hand—resolving

246. See cases cited infra notes 247‒52 and accompanying text.
247. 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
248. Id. at 550‒52.
249. 212 U.S. 227 (1909).
250. Id. at 266‒67.
251. 236 U.S. 165 (1915).
252. Id. at 177.
253. Cont’l Wall Paper Co., 212 U.S. at 270‒71.
254. See Bridgeman, supra note 30, at 1469. As critics may point out, this is also its weakness
because it does not provide a substantive standard. However, the first step towards making it better
is simply recognizing the principle explicitly. Id.
255. See, e.g., Richard G. Singer, Proportionate Thoughts About Proportionality, 8 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 217, 218 (2010). On this point, the lesser evil principle is analogous to the
proportionality principles that the U.S. Supreme Court has implicitly adopted in its constitutional
review of government actions. Id. Some scholars have been advocating an explicit adoption of the
proportionality principles to guide the Court’s constitutional review of government actions and
their impact on individual rights. See also SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 32, at 171.
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disputes in a way that minimizes damage to important public interests.256
Further, explicitly adopting the lesser evil principle relieves courts of having to
explain their way around the general rule of non-enforcement by creating
numerous exceptions called for by the facts of the particular cases.257
Explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle will not be difficult. As the above
scenarios suggest, despite several courts’ attempts to ground their reasoning in
the existing rules and their associated exceptions, the courts were typically
guided by the invisible presence of the lesser evil principle.258
Additionally, explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle will eventually lead
to more predictability and certainty in the marketplace. 259 Moreover, these
issues can increase transaction costs if parties have to expend resources to
contract around the rules.260 Finally, a lack of certainty with respect to illegal
transaction adjudications can also result in over deterring innovative business
transactions and under deterring illegal transactions.261
Therefore, explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle is urgently needed
these days. The easy cases, which gave rise to the non-enforcement remedy
historically, are increasingly less likely to occur because of potential sanctions
imposed by criminal law.262 Businesses now face a greater number of
regulations over commercial transactions.263 Under the current state of affairs,
“failure to comply with the relevant provision risks a finding that the whole
transaction is illegal” and therefore unenforceable.264 In addition, the prevalence
of business regulations means that the issues are likely going to become
increasingly complicated, and will likely result in these difficult cases arriving

256. See Badawi, supra note 19, at 484‒85.
257. Wade, supra note 10, at 60‒62.
258. Id. See also cases cited supra Part III.B.
259. This Article does not suggest that adopting the lesser evil principle will eliminate all
inconsistencies among courts. Still, as the system currently exists, courts face a tremendously
difficult task in balancing competing interests in situations where no one interest holds a trump
card. Such inconsistency is likely the result of simple differences of opinions while weighing
multiple competing interests, which yields conflicting judicial decisions. As noted by one judge,
these conflicting decisions can be attributed to different views of public policy among judges’ as
opposed to a difference in adjudicatory theory. See Birdsall v. Coon, 139 S.W. 243, 246 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1911); see also Strong, supra note 17, at 348 (pointing out that “[o]ne of the reasons for the
apparent confusion is the fact that illegality may appear in many forms and in varying degrees”).
However, adopting the lesser evil principle will minimize these inconsistencies due to confusion
surrounding applicable jurisprudential standards.
260. Badawi, supra note 19, at 487.
261. Id. at 488‒89.
262. Id. at 487‒88.
263. Paula Giliker, Restitution, Reform and Illegality: An End to Transactional Uncertainty?,
2001 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 102, 105.
264. Id.
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before the courts in a greater frequency.265 Therefore, a clear standard guiding
these courts will better help minimize uncertainty in the marketplace.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts must wrestle with competing interests when adjudicating illegal
agreement disputes. While the general rule of non-enforcement is appealing, it
is deceptively over-simplistic. Case review shows that courts have not applied
the rule rigidly, and rightfully so.266 Instead, courts have developed multiple
exceptions to allow greater flexibility in order to adapt to different factual
scenarios.267 This flexibility allows courts to grant or deny relief depending on
the facts of each case, but it also creates a confusing body of law that defies a
coherent theory.
Courts’ choices of remedies have so far been primarily explained and
understood in terms of a general rule of non-enforcement, with multiple
exceptions and exceptions within exceptions.268 Except for a few scholarly
attempts to make sense of the case law,269 there appears to be no unifying
principle. However, close examination of the case law shows the guiding
presence of the lesser evil principle, albeit implicitly.
This article advocates an explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle in
adjudicating illegal agreement disputes. The principle provides better guidance
to courts than the current hodgepodge of rules with exceptions. It helps courts
focus their analyses on the consequences of their choices, allowing a refinement
of the standards when applying the principle, and encouraging more consistent
application of the principle.
Finally, explicit adoption of the principle will offer better guidance to
practitioners when advising clients on these issues.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Badawi, supra note 19, at 487‒88.
Harvard Note 1913, supra note 58, at 739‒40.
Wade, supra note 10, at 61‒62.
Id.
See, e.g., Furmston, supra note 10, at 268‒69, 272‒75; Wade, supra note 10, at 61‒62.

